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duty d. greene*
AT&T Communications of Maryland v. Comptroller
of the Treasury: Responding to the Call for Judicial
Activism and the Creation of Tax Shelters
i. introduction
In AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF MARYLAND V. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY,1 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland (“Court of Appeals”) considered whether AT&T
owed more than $5 million in uncollected use taxes for “1-900” interstate telephone
calls made over its network between 1992 and 2001.2 In light of Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,3 the Court of Appeals held that, under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,4 AT&T was not obligated to collect use taxes from its in-state custom-
ers because AT&T acted as a common carrier of 1-900 telecommunications services
and did not exceed the customary role of a common carrier.5 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court of Appeals interpreted the term “common carrier” in a way that
ignores: (1) the plain meaning of the term “common carrier” as expressed in the
Bellas Hess and Quill decisions,6 (2) the Supreme Court’s sales and use tax jurispru-
dence,7 and (3) well-settled principles of judicial review of administrative action.8
© 2010 Duty D. Greene.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2010; M.B.A. Candidate, Robert H. Smith
School of Business, University of Maryland, 2010; B.A. cum laude, Economics, Florida International University,
2005.
1. 950 A.2d 86 (Md. 2008).
2. Id. at 89, 90.
3. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). In Quill, the Court considered whether a state’s attempt to require an out-of-state
mail-order house, which had neither outlets nor sales representatives in the state, to collect and pay use taxes
on goods purchased within the state was constitutional. Id. at 301. The Court held that under the dormant
Commerce Clause of the Constitution an out-of-state mail-order catalog vendor was exempt from collecting
state use taxes because it did not have a physical presence in the state, such as a store, office, warehouse, or
small sales force. See id. at 314–15, 318. In so holding, the Court established that in the absence of any action
by Congress, vendors are free from state imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes if their only contacts with
customers in the taxing state are by common carrier or the United States Postal Service. See id. at 315, 318. The
Court of Appeals also relied on National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
5. AT&T Commc’ns of Md., 950 A.2d at 99.
6. See infra Part V.A.
7. See infra Part V.B.
8. See infra Part V.C.
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AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF MARYLAND V. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
Instead, the Court of Appeals should have declared that AT&T is not a common
carrier that is exempt from state taxation under Quill because Congress has already
established in the Telecommunications Act of 19969 that common carriers of tele-
communications services, such as 1-900 services, are not exempt from state regula-
tion.10 By failing to examine federal law to determine whether Congress has
expressly exempted telecommunications providers from state regulation, the Court
of Appeals created an unreasonable “common carrier exception” under Quill that
finds little support in federal law and decided a complex policy issue that legislators
and administrative law courts are better suited to resolve.11
ii. the case
A. Factual Background
Telephone numbers that begin with the area code “900” allow consumers to
purchase information or services such as psychic readings, sports scores, and
weather information over the telephone.12 Federal jurisdiction over the 900-services
industry is split between the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the U.S. Postal Service.13 In 1992, the Ma-
ryland General Assembly imposed a sales and use tax on 1-900 telecommunications
services.14 Under Maryland tax law, vendors are obligated to collect use taxes from
buyers.15 The vendor’s failure to do so results in the vendor assuming the tax liabil-
ity of the buyer.16
Between 1992 and 2001, AT&T marketed and sold 1-900 numbers to out-of-state
information vendors.17 AT&T’s connections with the sale of 1-900 numbers in-
cluded: (1) contacting and entering into agreements with out-of-state information
9. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 56, 143–44 (1996) (codified in 47 U.S.C. § 152 note
(2006)) (providing that the 1996 Act in no way supersedes any state or local law pertaining to taxation).
10. See infra Part V.D.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 932 A.2d 748, 750 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2007).
13. Nancy D. Galvez, 900 Numbers: A Controversial Industry, 10 J. Consumer Edu. 1, 3–4 (1992).
The FCC monitors long-distance carriers and shares jurisdiction with states over billing and collec-
tion services. The FTC handles cases of interstate consumer fraud and deceptive practices and investi-
gates complaints of consumers who were overcharged for 900-number services or did not receive the
services advertised. Postal Service inspectors may investigate for fraud if any part of a 900-number
call involves mail delivery.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 11-101(m)(5) (West 2004). The statute provides:  “Taxable service
means . . . ‘900’, ‘976’, ‘915’, and other ‘900’ –type telecommunications service.” Id.
15. Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 11-401(a) (West 2004). The Statute provides:  “A vendor is a trustee for
the State and is liable for the collection of the sales and use tax for and on account of the State.” Id.
16. Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 11-601(c) (West 2004). The Statute provides: “Personal liability for the
sales and use tax and for the interest and penalties of the tax extends to . . . a vendor . . . that . . . does not . . .
collect from the buyer as required in § 11-403 of this title . . . .” Id.
17. AT&T Commc’ns of Md., 932 A.2d at 750–51.
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vendors; (2) reviewing the vendor’s advertisements and preamble messages for con-
sumers; and (3) receiving funds for the transport of preamble messages over part of
its network, dispute resolution services, and billing and collection services.18 On
May 17, 2001, the Comptroller of Maryland (“the Comptroller”) assessed AT&T
over $5 million in uncollected use taxes for 1-900 calls completed over its network
between January 1, 1992 and February 28, 2001.19
B. Procedural History
On July 12, 2001, AT&T challenged its tax assessment before the Comptroller in a
hearing.20 The Comptroller affirmed the assessment on the grounds that AT&T was
a “ ‘co-vendor of 900 telecommunications services along with the information
providers, and, therefore, liable for remitting sales tax.’ ”21
On May 17, 2004, AT&T appealed the assessment before the Maryland Tax Court
(“Tax Court”).22 AT&T maintained that: (1) it was not a vendor or an agent of out-
of-state information vendors; and (2) as a regulated provider of 1-900 numbers, it
functioned as a common carrier that was exempt from tax collection and remit-
tance responsibilities under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.23 On Janu-
ary 3, 2005, the Tax Court rejected each of AT&T’s arguments and affirmed the
assessment on the grounds that AT&T’s “ ‘function greatly exceeded that of a com-
mon carrier’ ” and that AT&T “ ‘acted with the [out-of-state information vendors]
in every step of the transaction[s].’ ”24
On September 30, 2005, AT&T sought judicial review of its tax assessment in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.25 AT&T again argued that it neither sold nor
delivered a taxable service in the state.26 According to AT&T, the taxable service was
the sale of information that the out-of-state information vendors provided to the
ultimate customer; not the sale of 1-900 numbers to the public.27 AT&T argued that
it only sold “transport services” to out-of-state information vendors and did not
sell information services to the ultimate customer.28 The circuit court disagreed and
concluded that: (1) AT&T was a vendor and a representative of the out-of-state
information vendors in Maryland; and (2) the taxable service was the entire tele-
18. Id. at 750.
19. Id. at 750–51.
20. Id. at 751.
21. Id.
22. AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 90 (Md. 2008).
23. Id. at 90–91.
24. Id. at 91.
25. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 932 A.2d 748, 751 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2007).
26. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2005 WL 5582024, at *6 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 30, 2005).
27. Id. at *5–6.
28. Id. at *7.
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AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF MARYLAND V. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
communications service.29 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the circuit court and relied primarily on the findings of the Tax Court to
conclude that AT&T “is liable for the sales tax because AT&T was . . . not merely a
‘common carrier’ of the 900 service, and . . . was a jointly-responsible agent of the
out-of-state vendors.”30
On December 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari31 to consider:
Whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s “bright-line” test in National Bellas
. . . Hess and Quill . . . , substantial nexus is created, thereby permitting
Maryland to require a common carrier to collect a use tax on a sale from an
out-of-state seller to a Maryland customer, when the out-of-state seller uses the
common carrier to deliver its product (or service), and when the common car-
rier provides the out-of-state seller with services ancillary to, and in addition
to, the delivery of the product (or service).32
iii. legal background
In the seventeen years since the United States Supreme Court decided Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota,33 the constitutional limits of state sales and use taxes on interstate
commerce have remained obscure and controversial.34 Legislative bodies charged
with implementing the Supreme Court’s decrees have struggled to establish tax
policies that balance the government’s interest in raising tax revenues and the pub-
lic’s interest in fostering business investment.35 Part A of this section provides a
brief overview of state sales and use taxes and focuses on how the Constitution
restricts state taxing powers.36 Part B traces the Supreme Court’s development of
the “sufficient nexus” doctrine.37 Part C provides a brief discussion of the standard
of review of administrative action.38 Finally, Part D examines state regulation of
telecommunications carriers under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.39
29. Id. at *5–7.
30. AT&T Commc’ns of Md., 932 A.2d at 749–50.
31. AT&T v. Comptroller, 936 A.2d 852 (Md. 2007).
32. AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 92 (Md. 2008).
33. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
34. In Quill, the Court characterized its own jurisprudence in the area of sales and use taxes as “something
of a ‘quagmire’ . . . [that] ‘leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.’ ” Id. at 315–16 (quoting Nw. States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1959)).
35. See id. at 318 n.11 (noting unenacted congressional legislation that would have overruled the Bellas
Hess rule and permitted states to impose use tax collection obligations on out-of-state vendors with no physical
presence in the taxing state).
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra Part III.B.
38. See infra Part III.C.
39. See infra Part III.D.
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A. Constitutional Limitations on Sales and Use Taxes
Sales and use taxes are an important source of revenue for state and local govern-
ments.40 In Maryland, sales and use taxes account for the second largest source of
state funding, accounting for $3.7 billion in tax revenue and 31% of total revenues
for the 2008 fiscal year.41 Under Maryland tax law, out-of-state vendors and their
“agents” are required to collect and remit use taxes from the retail sale of taxable
services to in-state consumers.42 However, the state’s power to impose sales and use
taxes on out-of-state vendors is subject to two constitutional restraints: the Due
Process Clause43 and the Commerce Clause.44
The Due Process Clause ensures fundamental fairness of government activity.45
Under the Due Process Clause, a state cannot impose tax liabilities on out-of-state
vendors unless the vendor can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”46
based on its activities in the taxing state.47 This fair-warning requirement is satisfied
if the out-of-state vendor has engaged in “systematic and continuous activities” in
the state, or has engaged in activities that are “purposefully directed” at residents of
the state.48 Accordingly, a state may impose taxes and exercise personal jurisdiction
40. A sales tax is defined as “[a] tax imposed on the sale of goods and services, usually measured as a
percentage of their price.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1498–99 (8th ed. 2004). On the other hand, a use tax is
“[a] tax imposed on the use of certain goods that are bought outside the taxing authority’s jurisdiction. Use
taxes are designed to discourage the purchase of products that are not subject to the sales tax.” Id. at 1499. See
generally Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 11-102(a) (West 2004). The Statute provides: “(a) Sales and use tax
imposed.– Except as otherwise provided in this title, a tax is imposed on: (1) a retail sale in the State; and (2) a
use, in the State, of tangible personal property or a taxable service.” Id.
41. Comptroller of Maryland, Consolidated Revenue Report Fiscal Year 2008 13, 21 (2008),
available at http://www.marylandtaxes.com/finances/revenue/reports/consolidated/crr-08.pdf.
42. See Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 11-403(a)(1) (West 2008). The Statute provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) Duty of vendor to collect.– Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a vendor shall collect the applica-
ble sales and use tax from the buyer: (1) at the time that the sale is made . . . .” Id.
43. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
44. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
45. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Due process centrally concerns the funda-
mental fairness of governmental activity.”); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(interpreting the Due Process Clause to require an out-of-state vendor to have “certain minimum contacts” in a
state such that the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
46. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding that Hustler Magazine, Inc.
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in New Hampshire to defend against a libel action based on
the contents of its magazine and its continuous and deliberate exploitation of the New Hampshire market).
47. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (noting that an out-of-state vendor’s “ ‘[p]resence’ in [a] state . . . has
never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic,
but also give rise to the liabilities sued on . . . .”).
48. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–80 (1985) (holding that the District Court of
Florida’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Burger King franchise owners located in Michigan did not of-
fend the Due Process Clause because the out-of-state franchise owners deliberately reached out beyond Michi-
gan by negotiating for the purchase of a long-term franchise with a Florida corporation and envisioning
continuing contacts with Florida).
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AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF MARYLAND V. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
over an out-of-state vendor in conformity with the Due Process Clause if the out-
of-state vendor conducts business by physically traveling into the state and pur-
posely availing itself of the benefits of the state’s laws and economic market.49 Like-
wise, the inverse of this rule also holds true: states have no authority under the Due
Process Clause to impose tax obligations or exercise personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state vendors that only have random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts in the
state.50
In contrast, the Commerce Clause is an express grant of power to Congress to
regulate commerce among the states.51 Although the Commerce Clause says noth-
ing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of congressional
action,52 the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to limit the authority of the
states to impose taxes that unduly burden interstate commerce53 or discriminate
against interstate commerce.54 The Supreme Court has commonly referred to this
implicit limitation on state taxing power as the “dormant Commerce Clause.”55
Accordingly, the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause reflect different con-
stitutional concerns and policies.56 On the one hand, the Due Process Clause re-
flects the constitutional concern over the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants who have no meaningful contacts or conceivable connection
with the taxing state.57 The Commerce Clause, on the other hand, reflects the con-
49. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 276, 287–89 (1977) (upholding a state tax “ ‘for
the privilege of . . . doing business’ ” in Mississippi levied on an out-of-state corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of transporting GMC vehicles by motor carrier).
50. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984) (holding that a
Texas state court could not assert personal jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation in conformity with the
Due Process Clause because the cause of action against the foreign corporation did not arise out of or relate to
the corporation’s activities in Texas); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(holding that the District Court of Oklahoma could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state car
dealership consistent with the Due Process Clause because the out-of-state vendor did not carry on any busi-
ness activities in the state or avail itself of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law).
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
53. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 665, 671 (1981) (holding that an Iowa
statute that restricted the use of 65-foot freight trucks on its highways unconstitutionally burdened interstate
commerce).
54. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618, 629  (1978) (holding that a New Jersey law that
prohibited landfill sites from accepting solid or liquid waste that originated outside the territorial limits of the
state unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce).
55. The word “dormant” in connection with the Commerce Clause originated in the dicta of Chief Justice
John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the
power to regulate interstate commerce “can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in
the hands of agents, or lie dormant.” Id. Later, in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., Chief Justice Marshall
wrote “[w]e do not think, that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh company to place a dam across
the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.” 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245,
252 (1829) (emphasis added).
56. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
57. Id.
148 journal of business & technology law
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stitutional concern over state regulations that pose threats to the national
economy.58
B. The Development of the “Sufficient Nexus” Doctrine
Before the 1992 Quill decision, the Supreme Court’s sales and use tax jurisprudence
did not distinguish between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause to
limit state taxation of interstate commerce.59 In Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,60 a
case involving a state that imposed use tax collection obligations on an out-of-state
vendor with no physical presence in the state, the Supreme Court established that
the Due Process Clause required “some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property[,] or transaction it seeks to tax.”61 Subse-
quently, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,62 the Supreme Court adopted the term “nexus” to
describe the degree of “sufficient contacts or connections” an out-of-state vendor
must have in a state before that state can constitutionally impose use tax collection
obligations on the out-of-state vendor under the Due Process Clause and Com-
merce Clause.63
Between 1954 and 1977, Miller Bros.,64 Scripto,65 National Bellas Hess v. Depart-
ment of Revenue,66 and National Geographic v. California Board of Equalization,67 all
58. Id.
59. See id. at 305–06.
60. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
61. See id. at 341, 344–45 (holding that, under the Due Process Clause, Maryland could not impose a use
tax collection obligation on an out-of-state vendor that sold goods to Maryland residents directly out of its
store in Delaware because the out-of-state vendor, by its acts and course of dealing, did not subject itself to
Maryland’s taxing power).
62. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
63. See id. at 208, 210–11 (“There must be . . . ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, between a
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’ We believe that such a nexus is present here.”
(emphasis added)).
64. In Miller Bros., the Court held that the following factors did not establish a sufficient nexus for Mary-
land to impose a use tax collection on an out-of-state vendor: (1) advertisements, not especially directed to
Maryland residents, in newspapers and radio stations located in Delaware but reached Maryland residents; (2)
occasional sales flyers that the out-of-state vendor mailed to all of its former customers, including its customers
in Maryland; (3) the delivery of some purchases to common carriers consigned to Maryland addresses; and (4)
the delivery of some purchases to Maryland addresses with its own shipping trucks. See Miller, 347 U.S. at
341–42.
65. In Scripto, the Court concluded that a Georgia vendor—who employed ten “advertising specialty bro-
kers” or “wholesalers” who were residents of Florida and received compensation on a commission basis
through continuous solicitation of Florida customers—created a sufficient nexus for Florida to impose a use
tax collection obligation on the out-of-state vendor in conformity with the Commerce Clause and Due Process
Clause. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 208–09, 211–12. The Court distinguished Miller Bros. on the grounds that in
Miller, the out-of-state vendor had no solicitors in Maryland, did not exploit Maryland’s consumer market, and
did not engage in regular systematic displaying of its products by catalogs or samples. Id. at 212.
66. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). In Bellas Hess, the Court held that a Missouri-based mail-order catalog vendor
did not establish a sufficient nexus in Illinois by mailing a catalog to Illinois residents twice a year and occa-
sionally mailing advertising flyers to past and potential customers in Illinois. Id. at 754, 760.
67. 430 U.S. 551 (1977). In National Geographic, the Court held that an out-of-state mail-order vendor
established a sufficient nexus in California by maintaining two offices in California to solicit advertising for the
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clarified that a “sufficient nexus” to impose use tax collection obligations on out-
of-state vendors in conformity with the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause
required an out-of-state vendor to maintain a permanent physical presence in the
taxing state.68 In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court explained that states could not
constitutionally impose use tax collection obligations on the activities of out-of-
state mail-order catalog vendors because the state did not have a “legitimate claim
to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government.’ ”69 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court refused to entangle mail-order catalog vendors with the burden-
some and complicated efforts to comply with the different tax regulations of vari-
ous jurisdictions since it would unduly burden interstate commerce.70
Ten years after deciding Bellas Hess, in 1977, the Supreme Court reversed its
long-standing view that interstate commerce was immune from state taxation in
the Complete Auto decision.71 The Complete Auto case involved a state imposing a
“business privilege tax”72 on an out-of-state vendor that transported motor vehicles
by motor carrier into the state.73 After noting that the out-of-state vendor did not
allege that its activities did not create a “sufficient nexus” to justify the tax, the
Supreme Court indicated that it would affirm a state tax if: (1) it was related to
services provided by the state; (2) it did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; and (3) it did not present a danger of subjecting the out-of-state vendor to
multiple taxation.74 The Supreme Court emphasized that interstate commerce was
not immune from state taxation and must pay its fair share of state taxes even
though it increases the cost of doing business.75
In accordance with its decision in Complete Auto, the Supreme Court affirmed
that interstate commerce was not immune from state taxation in Goldberg v.
Sweet.76 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court considered whether a state tax on inter-
state telephone calls, originated or received by a person in the state, violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.77 To make this determination, the Supreme Court ana-
out-of-state company’s magazine business, an activity that was unrelated to the out-of-state vendor’s mail-
order business for the sale of maps, atlases, globes, and books. See id. at 552, 562. The Court explained that the
out-of-state vendor had a “substantial presence” in California because its two offices generated approximately
$1 million in annual advertising sales. See id. at 556, 560.
68. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
69. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753–54, 759–60.
70. Id. at 759–60.
71. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv.
v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)).
72. A privilege tax is defined as “[a] tax on the privilege of carrying on a business or occupation for which
a license or franchise is required.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1498 (8th ed. 2004).
73. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 275–76.
74. Id. at 287–88.
75. Id. at 288.
76. 488 U.S. 252, 254 (1989).
77. See id. at 254, 256. In 1985, Section 4 of the Telecommunications Excise Tax Act provided, in relevant
part:
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lyzed the tax under Complete Auto’s four-part test.78 The Supreme Court first con-
sidered whether the tax was applied to an activity with a “substantial nexus” with
the state, and noted that all the parties agreed that Illinois had a “sufficient nexus”
to justify the tax.79 According to the Supreme Court, only two states had a sufficient
nexus to tax an interstate telephone call: (1) the state where the phone call
originates or terminates and is charged to a service address in that state; and (2) the
state where the phone call originates or terminates and is billed or paid within that
state.80 After determining that the state had a substantial nexus with the interstate
telephone calls reached by the tax, the Supreme Court subsequently concluded that
the tax was fairly apportioned,81 did not discriminate against interstate commerce,82
and was fairly related to services that the state provided to the taxpayer.83 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court concluded that a state tax on interstate telephone calls
did not offend the Commerce Clause.84
Twenty-five years after deciding Bellas Hess, in 1992, the Supreme Court recon-
sidered the relevance of having a bright-line rule to establish a sufficient nexus for
A tax is imposed upon the act or privilege of originating in this State or receiving in this State
interstate telecommunications by a person in this State at the rate of 5% of the gross charge for such
telecommunications purchased at retail from a retailer by such person.
Id. at 256 n.5.
78. Id. at 257 (stating that a tax on interstate commerce does not offend the Commerce Clause if it “[1] is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State”).
79. Id. at 260 (“As all parties agree that Illinois has a substantial nexus with the interstate telecommunica-
tions reached by the Tax Act . . . .”).
80. Id. at 263. Further, the Court expressed “doubt that termination of an interstate telephone call, by
itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a call.” Id.
81. To determine whether the tax was fairly apportioned, the Supreme Court examined whether the tax
was internally and externally consistent. Id. at 261. The Court concluded that the tax was internally consistent
because only one state would tax each interstate telephone call if every state imposed the same tax on an in-
state service address. Id.  Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that the tax was externally consistent
because the tax reasonably reflected the in-state component of the activity being taxed. Id. at 262. The Court
explained that the tax had many characteristics of a sales tax, because it was assessed on the individual con-
sumer for the retail purchase of an interstate telephone call and was collected by the retailer. Id. Although the
Court recognized that the tax posed a risk of multiple taxation for taxpayers with service addresses and billing
locations in different states, the Court concluded that the tax’s credit provision avoided this limited possibility.
Id. at 264. As such, the Supreme Court held that the tax was fairly apportioned. Id. at 265.
82. The Supreme Court concluded that the tax did not impose a discriminatory tax on interstate com-
merce because the state’s flat tax of 5% on the gross charge on interstate telephone calls originating from
within the state did not favor intrastate commerce at the expense of interstate commerce. Id. at 265–66. The
Court emphasized that “[i]t is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own
state taxes.” Id. at 266.
83. The Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that the tax was fairly related to the benefits re-
ceived by Illinois telephone consumers. Id. at 267. The Court explained that the benefits that Illinois provided
to its citizens were not limited to only the telecommunications equipment used during each interstate tele-
phone call. Id. Instead, the Court reasoned that interstate commerce must contribute its fair share to the cost
incurred by the state to provide all governmental services, including the cost of other telephone service and
police and fire protection. Id.
84. Id. at 267; cf. id. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because the Illinois Telecommunications Excise Tax is
assessed upon intrastate and interstate calls at precisely the same rate, it poses no constitutional difficulty.”).
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state taxation in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.85 As in Bellas Hess, the Quill case
involved a state that imposed a use tax on an out-of-state mail-order catalog ven-
dor.86 Instead of adhering to precedent, the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Commerce Clause no longer mandated an out-of-state vendor to
have a physical presence within a state in order to create a sufficient nexus for
taxation and subject itself to a duty to collect and remit state use taxes.87 The North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that advances in technology had transformed the
mail-order business “from a relatively inconsequential market niche” with sales of
“$2.4 billion in 1967” into a “goliath” with annual sales of “$183.3 billion in 1989.”88
In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that advances in technol-
ogy greatly eased the burdensome and complicated efforts to comply with the tax
obligations of various jurisdictions.89 Based on these findings, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that Quill’s economic presence in the state created a sufficient
nexus to require Quill to collect state use taxes.90
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision, and reaffirmed Bellas Hess in part, by
holding that an out-of-state vendor creates a “sufficient nexus” under the Com-
merce Clause by having a physical presence within the taxing state.91 The Supreme
Court explained that in the area of sales and use taxes, the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause were analytically distinct because they reflect different constitu-
tional concerns and policies.92 According to the Supreme Court, an out-of-state
vendor could have sufficient “minimum contacts” to subject itself to a state’s in
personam jurisdiction in conformity with the Due Process Clause, but not have a
“sufficient nexus” to subject itself to a state’s tax authority under the Commerce
Clause.93 The Supreme Court grounded this legal distinction on the fact that the
Constitution grants Congress the ultimate power to authorize state taxes that bur-
den interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, but does not similarly grant
85. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
86. Id. at 301. Quill sold close to $1 million in sales to about 3,000 customers and purposefully directed its
advertisements through catalogs, flyers, national periodicals, and telephone calls. Id. at 302.
87. The Supreme Court of North Dakota explained that “ ‘tremendous social, economic, commercial, and
legal innovations’” had rendered the Bellas Hess holding obsolete. Id. (quoting State by Heitkamp v. Quill
Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991)).
88. See Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 208–09.
89. Id. at 215.
90. Id. at 219.
91. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311, 317 (“Bellas Hess . . . stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only
contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the ‘substantial nexus’ required by the
commerce Clause.”). But see id. at 328 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that
Quill’s economic presence in North Dakota established a sufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause because
Quill derived numerous commercial benefits from state banking institutions that supported its credit transac-
tions, waste disposal services, enforcement of consumer protection laws, and a climate of consumer confidence
to bolster the reputation of mail-order houses).
92. Id. at 305.
93. Id. at 307, 313.
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Congress the ultimate power to authorize violations of due process under the Due
Process Clause.94
C. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: An Overview
Taxpayers must resolve challenges to state taxes on constitutional grounds in state
forums.95 Most state tax disputes are resolved by state tax courts, independent
quasi-judicial administrative agencies within the executive branch of state govern-
ments, which decide cases after making findings of fact and conclusions of law.96 In
Maryland, final determinations of the Tax Court are subject to judicial review in
the circuit courts and the Court of Appeals.97
On appeal, the scope of judicial review of an administrative decision is narrow
and limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and if the administrative decision is
premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.98 A court must accord a degree of
deference to an agency’s ruling because it implicates complex public policy prefer-
ences that agencies are better suited to resolve.99
On judicial review of state taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Su-
preme Court has stated that appellate courts must first address the threshold ques-
tion of whether Congress has affirmatively “acted or purported to act” pursuant to
its power to regulate interstate commerce.100 Under the Supremacy Clause of the
94. Id. at 305, 318.
95. Elizabeth Buroker Coffin, The Case for a State Tax Court, 8 St. & Loc. Tax L. 63, 68 (2003).
Taxpayers with state tax challenges must resolve them in state forums. Under deliberate Congres-
sional design, the states must provide tribunals and processes to enforce the rights of taxpayers,
protect them from the unconstitutional or unlawful imposition of taxes, and create for them fair and
accessible procedures by which they can assert their positions.
Id.
96. See Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 343 A.2d 521, 522, 527 (Md. 1975) (“[T]he Legislature
has delegated certain duties to the Tax Court, the performance of which requires it to make factual determina-
tions and adjudicate disputes. The Tax Court, therefore, can be said to act in a quasi-judicial capacity.”).
97. “Henceforth, judicial review of Tax Court cases shall be in the circuit courts of the counties or the
Baltimore City Court . . . .” See id. at 523 (holding that the Maryland Constitution does not grant the Court of
Appeals of Maryland original jurisdiction to review decisions from the Maryland Tax Court on appeal); Md.
Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-222(a) and 10-223(b) (West 2004).
98. See Md. State Dep’t of Educ. v. Shoop, 704 A.2d 499, 505 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (quoting United
Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (Md. 1994)).
99. “Upon appellate review, courts bestow special favor on an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.
Recognizing an agency’s superior ability to understand its own rules and regulations, a ‘court should not
substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which
the appeal is taken.’”  Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Reeders Mem’l. Home, Inc., 586 A.2d 1295,
1297–98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (quoting Bullock v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Md.
1978)).
100. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154 (1982); see also Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (“ ‘[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a
residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,  regulate it.’ ” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 767 (1945))).
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U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to preempt and supersede any state
law.101  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has explained that appellate courts may
only review administrative decisions that are “contrary to clear congressional in-
tent.”102 If Congress has not acted, courts are the “final arbiters under the Com-
merce Clause” in order to protect the free flow of interstate commerce.103 On the
other hand, if congressional intent is clear, courts are no longer needed to prevent
the states from burdening interstate commerce.104 Once Congress has acted pursu-
ant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, a court must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and no longer has authority to review
state taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause.105 If federal law is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific legal question at issue, on judicial review an
appellate court must determine whether the agency’s construction of a state tax
statute results in an erroneous judgment in light of congressional intent and ex-
isting federal law.106
D. State Regulation of Telecommunications Carriers Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
In the Communications Act of 1934,107 Congress established a dual system of state
and federal regulation of telecommunications providers.108 To this end, Congress
created the FCC in Section 1 of the 1934 Act and granted it exclusive authority to
regulate interstate telecommunications,109 and in Section 2(b), limited the FCC’s
jurisdiction by denying it power to regulate intrastate telecommunications ser-
vices.110 While the 1934 Act would seem to neatly divide all types of telecommuni-
cations services into two separate regulatory schemes, advances in technology have
blurred the lines of where exclusive state jurisdiction over intrastate matters ends
and exclusive federal jurisdiction over interstate matters begins.111
101. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
102. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools
of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.
Id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
103. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 154–55.
104. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
105. See id.; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 154–55.
106. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
107. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
108. See 74 Am. Jur. 2d Telecommunications § 13 (2001).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
110. “[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect to
. . . charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2006).
111. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
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Congress subsequently amended the 1934 Act with the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.112 With the 1996 Act, Congress sought to promote competition in the
telecommunications industry by reducing regulation and encouraging the rapid
deployment of new technologies.113 To achieve these goals, the 1996 Act prevents
state and local authorities from raising barriers to entry that prohibit the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications services.114
However, nothing in the 1996 Act prohibits states from imposing regulations and
taxes on a competitively neutral basis.115 In Section 601(c)(2) of the 1996 Act, Con-
gress expressly provides that:
“[N]othing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to modify, impair, or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or
supersession of, any State or local law pertaining to taxation . . . .”116
As such, the 1996 Act does not expressly preempt states from imposing sales and
use taxes on telecommunications providers that provide both intrastate and inter-
state telecommunications services.117
The Supreme Court explained the scope of state and federal regulation under the
1996 Act in National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices,118 where it stated that the 1996 Act “regulates telecommunications carriers,
but not information service providers . . . .”119 In Brand X Internet Services, the
Supreme Court considered whether the FCC lawfully concluded that cable compa-
nies that sold broadband Internet service did not provide a “telecommunications
service,” and were thus exempt from state and federal common-carrier regulation
under the Act.120 The Supreme Court explained that the 1996 Act’s definitions of
“telecommunications service”121 and “information service”122 were analogous to the
FCC’s traditional distinction between “basic”123 and “enhanced”124 services estab-
112. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
113. Id.
114. See 86 C.J.S. Telecommunications § 4 (2006).
115. See id.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006).
117. See id.
118. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
119. Id. at 975.
120. Id. at 973–74.
121. “Telecommunications service” is “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . .
regardless of the facilities used.” Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 3, 110 Stat. 56, 60 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(46) (2006)). “Telecommunications” is “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user,
of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.” Id. (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006)). “Telecommunications carrier[s]” are defined as “pro-
vider[s] of telecommunications services.” Id. (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2006)).
122. “Information service” is “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications.” Pub. L. No. 104-
104, § 3, 110 Stat. 56, 59 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006)).
123. The FCC defined a “basic service” as:
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 155
27675 m
lb_5-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B      02/18/2010   11:56:44
27675 mlb_5-1 Sheet No. 81 Side B
\\server05\productn\M\MLB\5-1\MLB102.txt unknown Seq: 14 10-FEB-10 9:01
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF MARYLAND V. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY
lished in the late 1970’s.125 Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed with the FCC
that broadband cable modem Internet service was an “information service”
because:
[I]t provides consumers with a comprehensive capability for manipulating in-
formation using the Internet via high-speed telecommunications. That service
enables users, for example, to browse the World Wide Web, to transfer files . . .
available on the Internet . . . and to access e-mail and Usenet newsgroups . . . .
All of these features . . . were part of the information service that cable compa-
nies provide consumers.126
At the same time, the Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that cable modem
service was not a “telecommunications service” because:
[Although] . . . cable companies[, like all information-service providers,] use
“telecommunications” to provide consumers with Internet service; cable compa-
nies provide such service via the high-speed wire that transmits signals to and
from an end user’s computer . . . . Seen from the consumer’s point of view . . .
cable modem service is not a telecommunications offering because the con-
sumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the information-
processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and because the transmis-
sion is a necessary component of Internet access . . . . The wire is used, in other
words, to access the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and so forth, rather than
“transparently” to transmit and receive ordinary-language messages without
computer processing or storage of the message . . . [Therefore,] cable modem
service is not a “stand-alone,” transparent offering of telecommunications.127
[A] pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of
its interaction with customer supplied information.”  By “pure” or “transparent” transmission, the
Commission meant a communications path that enabled the consumer to transmit an ordinary-
language message to another point, with no computer processing or storage of the information, other
than the processing or storage needed to convert the message into electronic form and then back into
ordinary language for purposes of transmitting it over the network—such as via a telephone or a
facsimile. Basic service was subject to common-carrier regulation.
Nat’l Cable and Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005) (citations omitted).
124. The FCC defined an “enhanced service” as:
[A] service in which “computer processing applications were used to act on the content, code, proto-
col, and other aspects of the subscriber’s information,” such as voice and data storage services . . . . By
contrast to basic service, the Commission decided not to subject providers of enhanced service, even
enhanced service offered via transmission wires, to Title II common-carrier regulation. The Commis-
sion explained that it was unwise to subject enhanced service to common-carrier regulation given the
“fast-moving, competitive market” in which they were offered.
Id. at 976–77 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 977.
126. Id. at 987 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 987–88 (citations omitted).
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Based on these findings, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s ruling that cable
modem Internet services were “information services” that were exempt from state
and federal common-carrier regulation under the 1996 Act.128
iv. the court’s reasoning
In AT&T Communications of Maryland v. Comptroller of the Treasury,129 the Court
of Appeals concluded, in a unanimous decision, that AT&T was not responsible for
paying more than $5 million in uncollected use taxes for 1-900 calls made over its
network between 1992 and 2001.130 To reach this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
considered three questions: (1) whether it could review the decision of the Mary-
land Tax Court;131 (2) whether AT&T qualified as a “common carrier” within the
meaning of Bellas Hess and Quill;132 and (3) whether AT&T acted outside of the
scope of an ordinary common carrier.133
With regard to the first question, the Court of Appeals concluded that it could
review the Maryland Tax Court’s decision because it only involved a question of
law.134 The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Comptroller that the Tax Court’s
decision implicated the exercise of the agency’s expertise and was therefore entitled
to deference.135 Instead, the Court of Appeals agreed with AT&T that determining
whether AT&T was a common carrier within the meaning of Bellas Hess and Quill
only involved a question of law.136
With regard to the second question, the Court of Appeals concluded that AT&T
could be reasonably characterized as a common carrier.137 The Court of Appeals
defined the term “common carrier” based on Maryland case law that described
common carriers as transporters of property that serve all who apply.138 The Court
of Appeals agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that “courts have long held
that under many circumstances, telephone (and) telegraph companies are common
128. Id. at 986.
129. 950 A.2d 86 (Md. 2008).
130. Id. at 99.
131. Id. at 91–92.
132. Id. at 94–95.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 92.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 95.
138. Carriers, as transporters of property or persons from one place to another, ordinarily are classi-
fied as ‘private’ or ‘common.’  [T]he test generally recognized for distinguishing a private from a
common carrier is that a common carrier is obliged, within the limits of its ability, to serve all who
apply, while a private carrier is under no such obligation.
Id. at 95 (quoting Rutledge Co-op. Ass’n v. Baughman, 138 A. 29, 31 (Md. 1927)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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carriers of messages.”139 The Court of Appeals also based its conclusion on F.C.C. v.
Midwest Video Corp.,140 where the Supreme Court stated:
A common-carrier service in the communications context is one that makes a
public offering to provide communications facilities whereby all members of the
public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit in-
telligence of their own design and choosing.141
By adopting this definition to the term “common carrier,” the Court of Appeals
concluded that AT&T could be reasonably characterized as a common carrier of 1-
900 telecommunications services because it offered 1-900 numbers to the public at
fixed prices.142
Finally, with regard to the third question, the Court of Appeals concluded that
AT&T did not exceed the customary role of a common carrier.143 Although all of
the lower courts found that AT&T’s substantial involvement with the 1-900 calls at
issue exceeded the role of a common carrier, the Court of Appeals concluded that
AT&T only acted in compliance with its role as an FCC regulatory compliance
overseer.144 As a result, the Court of Appeals held that AT&T acted as a common
carrier of 1-900 telecommunications services, and therefore the Comptroller could
not obligate AT&T to collect use taxes for the interstate 1-900 calls completed over
its network without violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.145
v. analysis
In AT&T Communications, the Court of Appeals became the first state court to
exempt telecommunications providers from state use tax collection obligations as
“common carriers” under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.146 Part A of this section
139. Id. (quoting AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 932 A.2d 748, 754 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
141. Id. at 701.
142. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md., 950 A.2d at 95.
143. Id. at 96.
144. Id. 97–99.
145. Id. at 99.
146. In other state courts, the determination of whether an out-of-state vendor has subjected itself to a
state’s use tax collection laws under Quill has turned on whether the activities of the out-of-state vendor
created a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state, rather than on the interpretation of the term “common
carrier.” See Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 192–93 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (upholding a state tax on Borders Books Online because its sister organization, Borders Books and
Music, operated several stores in the state); In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1122–23 (Kan. 2000)
(holding that an out-of-state vendor that sent technicians into Kansas eleven times during a 48-month audit
period to install electronic card readers for its customer’s photocopiers did not establish a sufficient nexus);
Scholastic Book Clubs v. State, 567 N.W.2d 692, 695–96 (Mich. 1997) (refusing to find an implied agency
relationship between Michigan school teachers and Scholastic Books); Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 676
So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that an out-of-state vendor that sent its employees to a medical
158 journal of business & technology law
27675 m
lb_5-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A      02/18/2010   11:56:44
27675 mlb_5-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A
\\server05\productn\M\MLB\5-1\MLB102.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-FEB-10 9:01
Duty D. Greene
examines how the Court of Appeals unconstitutionally intruded on the role of the
Maryland General Assembly by adopting a definition of the term “common carrier”
that conflicts with the term’s plain meaning in the context of sales and use taxes.147
Part B of this section examines how the Court of Appeals’s construction of Quill’s
“common carrier exception” is inapposite to the Supreme Court’s sales and use tax
jurisprudence.148 Part C of this section analyzes how the Court of Appeals commit-
ted legal error by ignoring the Supreme Court’s basic framework for analyzing
administrative decisions.149 Finally, Part D of this section analyzes how the Court of
Appeals should have concluded that AT&T is not a common carrier within the
meaning of Quill because Congress has already declared in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 that common carriers of basic telecommunications services, such as 1-
900 services, are not exempt from state taxation.150
A. The Court of Appeals’s Definition of the Term “Common Carrier” Conflicts
with the Term’s Plain Meaning
The Court of Appeals committed a basic legal error by adopting a judicial defini-
tion for the term “common carrier” that conflicts with the “normal, plain mean-
ing”151 of the term as expressed in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Bellas Hess and
Quill.152 Under Maryland law, “when the meaning of a word or phrase in a consti-
tutional or statutory provision is perfectly clear, [courts] will not give that word or
phrase a different meaning than is plainly understood.”153 In Bellas Hess and Quill,
the Supreme Court established that out-of-state vendors are free from state sales
and use taxes if their only contacts with customers in the state are by common
carrier or the U.S. Postal Service.154
Although the Supreme Court did not define the term “common carrier,” the
factual context of both cases established that the term “common carrier” described
an independent third-party transportation vessel that had to physically travel into a
exhibition in the state for three days each year, during a five-year period, did not create a nexus with the state);
In re Tax Appeal of Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947, 958 (Kan. 1996) (upholding a state tax on
Scholastic Books, a mail-order book seller, because school teachers acted as Scholastic’s sales agents by receiving
a commission for recommending books and collecting student orders); Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654
N.E.2d 954, 961 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that out-of-state seller created a substantial nexus by deriving $1 million
to $1.5 million in annual sales with employees that visited the state twelve times over a three-year audit period).
147. See infra Part V.A.
148. See infra Part V.B.
149. See infra Part V.C.
150. See infra Part V.D.
151. See Lamone v. Capozzi, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (Md. 2006).
152. The Court of Appeals concluded that AT&T could be reasonably characterized as a “common-carrier”
within the context of sales and use taxes because, under Maryland law, common carriers are “transporters of
property” that “serve all who apply” and “courts have long held that under many circumstances, telephone
(and) telegraph companies are common carriers of messages.” See AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of
the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 94–96 (2008) (citation omitted).
153. See Lamone, 912 A.2d at 685.
154. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
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state to deliver an out-of-state vendor’s goods.155 This plain meaning of the term is
supported by Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “common carrier” as “[a] com-
mercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight
or passengers for a fee.”156 Furthermore, no state court or Supreme Court decision
has indicated that the term “common carrier” should be broadly construed in the
context of sales and use taxes.157
By broadly defining the term common carrier as “transporters of property” that
“serve all who apply,” the Court of Appeals gave the term “common carrier” a
different meaning than is plainly understood in the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Bellas Hess and Quill.158 As a result, under the Court of Appeals’s interpretation of
the term “common carrier,” many other heavily regulated businesses that operate
in interstate and intrastate commerce can potentially avoid state tax collection obli-
gations by arguing that their activities are sufficiently analogous to the activities of
the U.S. Postal Service and shipping companies.159 Outside of the context of sales
and use taxes, the Supreme Court has previously stated that oil refining companies
that operate pipelines services are common carriers.160 Federal courts have also
stated that cruise ships are common carriers.161 Even operators of amusement parks
can potentially avoid state sales and use taxes by plausibly arguing that they are
155. See id. at 302.
156. Black’s Law Dictionary 226 (8th ed. 2004).
157. For state court opinions interpreting Quill, see supra note 146 and accompanying text. Since 1992, only
ten Supreme Court opinions have cited to Quill v. North Dakota and no case has indicated that entities other
than interstate freight transportation vessels qualify as “common carriers” that are exempt from state use tax
collection obligations under Quill. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009)
(striking down city tax that exclusively targeted large oil tankers); MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dep’t. of
Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498 (2008) (addressing the “unitary business” rule); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison,  520 U.S. 564 (1997) (striking down state exemption of property tax for charitable institu-
tions); General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (upholding state exemption of sales and use taxes
for local sellers, but not out-of-state sellers); United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 845 (1996)
(striking down “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on goods in export transit”); Oklahoma
Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995) (upholding state sales tax on purchase of bus tickets
to out-of-state destinations); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (upholding
California’s worldwide-combined reporting requirement for corporate franchise tax calculation); Itel Contain-
ers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (upholding state sales tax on lease of cargo containers within
the state for exclusive use in international shipping); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(deciding constitutionality of city ordnance); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992)
(taxing non-domiciliary corporation).
158. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 94–95 (Md. 2008). Unlike
the U.S. Postal Service or shipping companies, AT&T does not deliver tangible goods and does not have a
temporary presence in a state. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 n.14 (1989) (explaining that many of its
“Commerce Clause decisions concern state taxes on the movement of goods or the instrumentalities of inter-
state transportation,” such as trucks, cargo containers, motor carriers, oil pipelines, and buses).
159. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 101–02 (1975) (stating that an oil refining company
that operates interstate pipeline systems is a common carrier of petroleum products that is not exempt from
state privilege taxes under the Commerce Clause).
161. See Am. Ass’n of Cruise Passengers, Inc. v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 911 F.2d 786, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that cruise ships are common carriers under the Shipping Act).
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common carriers of persons who travel in interstate commerce.162 Given that the
Supreme Court did not foresee the development of the Internet and the rapid
spread of personal computers when it decided Quill in 1992,163 the Court of Ap-
peals should have adhered to the plain meaning of the term “common carrier” and
concluded AT&T was not a “common carrier” of 1-900 telecommunications ser-
vices within the context of sales and use taxes.164
B. The Court of Appeals’s Construction of Quill’s Common Carrier Exception Is
Inapposite to the Supreme Court’s Sales and Use Tax Jurisprudence
By not adhering to the plain meaning of the term “common carrier,” the Court of
Appeals’s legal reasoning results in a conclusion that is inapposite to the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Scripto v. Carson165 and Goldberg v. Sweet.166 In AT&T Communi-
cations of Maryland, the Court of Appeals reasoned that a telecommunications pro-
vider was exempt from sales and use taxes under Quill because transmitting
interstate telephone calls was analogous to shipping goods via the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice or common carrier.167 This reasoning by analogy leads to outcomes that con-
flict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Scripto, where it established that out-of-
state vendors are subject to state sales and use taxes if they employ “independent
contractors” in the state.168
In many ways, AT&T’s activities with the 1-900 calls at issue resemble the activi-
ties of the independent contractors that sold goods for out-of-state vendors in
Scripto.169 Both AT&T and the independent contractors had a permanent presence
in the taxing state and both received funds from out-of-state vendors based on sales
volume within the taxing state.170 However, under the Court of Appeals’s construc-
tion of Quill’s “common carrier exception,” independent contractors can avoid
state sales and use taxes if they perform activities that are sufficiently analogous to
the services offered by the U.S. Postal Service and shipping companies.171 This out-
162. Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 44 (Cal. 2005) (“ ‘Every one who offers to the public to carry
persons, property, or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus
offers to carry.’” (quoting Cal. Civil Code § 2168 (West 2009))).
163. See Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-line Sales, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
605, 628 (1997). Ashraf notes that, in light of changing technology, Quill’s bright-line presents physical pres-
ence rule is outmoded and in need of revision. Id. at 627. Ashraf concludes that the only way states can
constitutionally impose use tax collection obligations on out-of-state Internet vendors is if Congress passes a
statute to allow such taxation. Id. at 629.
164. See supra notes 151–163 and accompanying text.
165. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
166. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
167. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 99 (Md. 2008).
168. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 210–11.
169. Compare Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211, with AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2005
WL 103067, at *1–2 (Md. T.C. Jan. 3, 2005).
170. Compare Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211, with AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2005
WL 103067, at *1–2 (Md. T.C. Jan. 3, 2005).
171. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md., 950 A.2d at 95.
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come plainly contradicts the Supreme Court’s ruling in Scripto and invites clever
lawyers to exploit this tax loophole by altering the business practices of their cli-
ents.172 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’s legal interpretation of Quill and the
term “common carrier” blurs a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes
that will lead to increased litigation as more businesses alter their practices to re-
flect the business models of the U.S. Postal Service, interstate shipping companies,
and telecommunications providers.173
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’s construction of Quill’s “common carrier
exception” contradicts the Supreme Court’s ruling in Goldberg, where it established
that states can impose taxes on interstate telephone calls.174 In AT&T Communica-
tions of Maryland, the Court of Appeals concluded that Goldberg was inapposite to
the case at hand,175 because under Goldberg’s nexus requirements a state cannot tax
an interstate telephone call that: (1) originates or terminates in the state, and (2) is
charged or billed to an address or person located outside of the state.176 The Court
of Appeals explained that unlike Goldberg, where the carriage charge for interstate
calls was assessed to in-state customers, the carriage charge in Maryland was as-
sessed, billed, and paid for by out-of-state information vendors.177 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals concluded that Maryland did not have a substantial nexus with
the out-of-state information vendors.178
The Court of Appeals’s narrow reading of Goldberg loses sight of the aims of the
dormant Commerce Clause by not focusing on where the interstate telephone call
originates and who is the ultimate consumer of 1-900 telecommunications ser-
vices.179 Under the Court of Appeals’s reading of Goldberg, no state is permitted to
tax 1-900 calls that are paid for by entities located outside of the state where the call
originates.180 Although the Supreme Court expressed “doubt that termination of an
interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to
tax a call,”181 the Supreme Court probably did not foresee that the nexus require-
ments it created in Goldberg would lead to unreasonable outcomes that do not
accord with the Bellas Hess physical presence rule.182 At its core, the “substantial
nexus” doctrine is “a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”183
In this case, Maryland’s tax on interstate 1-900 telephone calls that originate in the
state and are ultimately paid for by consumers in the state does not burden inter-
172. See id.
173. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
174. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 254 (1989).






181. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989).
182. See id.
183. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).
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state commerce.184 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should not have interpreted
the term “common carrier” in a way that conflicts with existing Supreme Court
sales and use tax jurisprudence.
C. The Court of Appeals Ignored the Supreme Court’s Basic Framework for
Analyzing Administrative Decisions on Judicial Review
In light of well-settled principles of administrative law, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the Tax Court’s decision.185
Although the Tax Court’s opinion rested primarily on an interpretation of state
law, the Tax Court expressed uncertainty regarding the existence of a “common
carrier exception” under Quill and federal law.186 As such, the Court of Appeals
should have determined whether the Tax Court’s construction of Maryland’s tax
statute was “contrary to clear congressional intent” and resulted in an erroneous
judgment in light of existing federal law.187 By failing to examine federal law to
ascertain congressional intent to exempt telecommunications companies from state
taxation, the Court of Appeals impermissibly substituted the Tax Court’s reasona-
ble interpretation of Maryland’s tax statute for its own statutory construction.188
D. The Court of Appeals Should Have Declared That AT&T Is Not Exempt from
Sales and Use Taxes for Selling 1-900 Telecommunications Services Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
If the Court of Appeals had adhered to longstanding principles of judicial review of
administrative decisions, it would have discovered that Congress has already estab-
lished in the Telecommunications Act of 1996189 that states may impose sales and
use taxes on common carriers of basic “telecommunications services.”190 Since the
FCC has interpreted the 1996 Act as not exempting “telecommunications service
providers” from state regulation, the Court of Appeals should have concluded that
telecommunications companies are not “common carriers” that are exempt from
184. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 266–67.
185. See supra Part III.C.
186. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2005 WL 103067, at *2 (Md. T.C. Jan. 3,
2005).
187. To make this determination, the Court of Appeals should have: (1) ascertained whether Congress had
directly spoken on the precise question of whether telecommunications providers are exempt from state taxa-
tion; and (2) considered whether the Tax Court’s judgment was based on a permissible construction of the
statute in light of federal law. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
188. See id. at 843.
189. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
190. “[T]he Communications Act does not purport to limit a state’s ability to tax.” AT&T Commc’ns of
Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 2005 WL 5582024, at *9 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2005); Pub. L. No.
104-104, § 601(c)(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 56, 143–44 (1996) (codified in 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)). Congress also
indicated in the Internet Tax Freedom Act that telecommunications carriers engaged in telecommunications
services are not exempt from state sales and use taxes. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 118 Stat. 2615-719 (1998)
(codified in 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (2006)).
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use tax collection obligations within the meaning of Quill.191 Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals should have concluded it had no authority to review Maryland’s
tax on 1-900 telecommunications services under the dormant Commerce Clause
because Congress had already established that telecommunications service provid-
ers are not “common carriers” that are exempt from state sales and use taxation.192
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals had authority to review Maryland’s tax
statute under the dormant Commerce Clause, AT&T’s activity of selling 1-900
numbers to the public does not constitute an “information service”193 that is ex-
empt from state sales and use taxes under the 1996 Act.194 From the customer’s
perspective, AT&T does nothing more than transmit a pure transmission for its
customers to communicate with information vendors during 1-900 telephone
calls.195 No facts indicate that AT&T employs computer-processing equipment to
manipulate the form or content of the information sent and received over its net-
work during a 1-900 telephone call.196 Furthermore, many courts have upheld state
tax statutes that reflect the FCC’s distinction between taxable telecommunications
services and non-taxable information services.197 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
could have alternatively concluded that AT&T is not exempt from state sales and
use taxes under Quill because selling 1-900 telecommunications services to the
public is not an “information service” that is exempt from state taxation under the
1996 Act.198
vi. conclusion
By holding that AT&T was a common carrier of 1-900 telecommunications services
that was exempt from collecting state use taxes, the Court of Appeals committed
legal error by ignoring: (1) the plain meaning of the term “common carrier” as
expressed in the factual context of the Bellas Hess and Quill decisions;199 (2) the
Supreme Court’s sales and use tax jurisprudence;200 and (3) well-settled principles
of judicial review of administrative action.201 Given that Congress has clearly ex-
pressed that common carriers of “telecommunications services” are not exempt
191. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973–75 (2005).
192. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154 (1982).
193. “Information service” is “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications . . . .” Pub. L. No.
104-104, § 3, 110 Stat. 56, 59 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006)).
194. See supra Part III.D.
195. See AT&T Commc’ns of Md. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 950 A.2d 86, 91 (Md. 2008).
196. See id.
197. Most states tax telecommunications services. See Sales and Use Taxes: Communications Services and
Electronic Commerce, 1350 § 05 Tax Mgmt. St. Port. (BNA) 2, n.182 (2009) (listing statutes of different states
that tax telecommunications services).
198. See supra notes 189–97 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part V.A.
200. See supra Part V.B.
201. See supra Part V.C.
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from state taxes under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Court of Appeals
should have declared that AT&T is not a “common carrier” within the meaning of
Quill.202 By failing to consider whether Congress had directly spoken on the precise
issue of whether telecommunications companies are exempt from state sales and
use taxes, the Court of Appeals created an unreasonable “common carrier excep-
tion” under Quill that finds little support in federal law.203 As a result, the Court of
Appeals improperly restrained the Maryland General Assembly’s power to tax 1-
900 telecommunications services and imprudently decided a complex policy issue
that legislators and administrative law courts are better suited to resolve.204
202. See supra Part V.D.
203. See supra Part V.
204. See supra Part V.
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